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I. INTRODUCTION

On February 9, 2009, the death of a young woman who had lain in a
permanent vegetative state (PVS) for seventeen years brought an end to an
unprecedented conflict between institutional powers in Italy. The case
drew attention to issues such as the refusal of life-sustaining medical
treatments, living wills, and the application of the "substitute judgment
test." It also focused the interest of scholars and society on the power of
judges to decide cases dealing with controversial ethical issues in areas not
addressed by legislation. In giving account of the events surrounding the
case, this note will focus on the case's constitutional implications and
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analyze relevant acts issued by the Italian judicial, legislative, and executive
powers. The case stands out as an example of the process of the redefinition of the traditional framework of sources of law and of the
structure of judicial review currently taking place in Italy. This process is
characterized by the growing relevance given to judicial intervention in the
production of law and by an increasingly residual role played by the
Parliament.
Eluana Englaro is the name of the woman who, with her personal
story, has focused public debate in Italy on right-to-die issues. The events
leading to her death began in 1992, when, at age twenty-one, she entered a
PVS due to a car accident, which left her dependent on a life-sustaining
treatment. Since 1999, her father and guardian, Mr. Beppino Englaro, had
repeatedly' sought a judicial order authorizing the removal of her feeding
tube. He claimed that the woman, in informal statements made before the
car accident (i.e., when conscious and of sound mind), had expressed a
desire to be left dying should she ever fall into a PVS. While over the years
bills have been introduced into the Italian Parliament, Italy still lacks
legislation that legally recognizes advanced directives and living wills. 2
Moreover, until the decision of the Supreme Court of Cassation at issue
here, courts had consistently refused to order the removal of life-sustaining
support on the basis of previous oral statements made by a now
unconscious patient.
II. THE GUIDELINES ISSUED BY THE COURT OF CASSATION AND THEIR
APPLICATION BY THE COURT OF APPEAL OF MILAN

Court of Cassation decision no. 21748 of October 16, 2007,3
originated from Mr. Englaro's latest application for removal of the feeding
tube. The Lecco Tribunal of first instance and the Milan Court of Appeal
rejected the application.4 However, on October 16, 2007, on appeal from
this latter decision, the Court of Cassation determined for the first time that
the feeding tube could be removed. After the Court qualified hydration
through the feeding tube as non-aggressive medical treatment, the Court of
Cassation defined "informed consent" as the only legitimate ground to
provide medical treatments. This decision was in reference to its own
previous jurisprudence interpreting Articles 2, 13, section 1, and Article 32,
1.
In 1999 and 2002, to no avail. Mr. Englaro then lodged again an application in 2005.
2.
Absent legislation, in Italy controversies involving informed consent and living wills are
addressed by courts on a case-by-case basis, on the basis of the general principles set forth in the
Constitution and in other non-statutory legal sources. See generally COSTITUZIONE [COST.]
[Constitution] arts. 1- 12 (Jan. 1, 1948) (It.).
3.
Cass., I civ., 16 Oct. 2007, n.21748, Foro It. 12007, vol. I, C.c., 3025 (It.).
4.
Trib. Lecco, 2 Feb. 2006, n.727/2005; Corte App., 16 Dec. 2006 (It.).
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section 2, of the Italian Constitution.5 According to the Court, informed
consent also includes the right to refuse medical care every time that refusal
is present, authentic, and informed. In the Court's view, refusal of medical
treatment (even when causing death) does not amount to euthanasia and
gives rise to the doctor's legal obligation to respect the patient's will and
discontinue undesired treatments. The Supreme Court also stated that
express advanced directives provided earlier in time (i.e., when conscious
and of sound mind) by a now-unconscious patient and identified as
undesired treatments, qualified as present, authentic, and informed refusal.
When directives are missing, however, (here lies the innovative part of the
decision), after prompt life-saving treatments are provided, the guardian
should be allowed to balance protection of the patient's life with her
conception of dignity and decorous life. Then, it can be ascertained
whether the now-unconscious patient would have preferred treatments to be
discontinued. The guardian, together with the court requested to grant
removal, will consider the patient's mind before losing consciousness or
infer it from her personality, lifestyle, and values. In addition, the removal
will be predicated on her ethical, religious, cultural, and philosophical
beliefs. The Court cited Articles 5 ("General Rule") and 6 ("Protection of
Persons Not Able to Consent") of the Oviedo Convention, Article 3 of the
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights,' and cases decided by the Supreme
Court of New Jersey (In re Quinlan8 and In re Nancy Ellen Jobes,9 which
applied the so-called "substituted judgment test.")
Following
Bundesgerichtshofand the House of Lords (the Bland caselo), the Court of
Cassation provided a detailed account of efforts carried out by foreign
courts to identify a PVS patient's mind with regard to the possibility of
ending life-sustaining treatments when no express advanced directives
existed." After urging the Italian Parliament to enact legislation in an area
still unaddressed by statutory law, the Supreme Court remanded the case to
5.
COSTITUZIONE [COST.] [Constitution] art. 2; 13, § 1; 32, § 2 (Jan. 1, 1948) (It.). The
Italian
Constitution
is
available,
in
English,
at:
http://www.senato.it/documenti/
repository/istituzione/costituzione inglese.pdf (last visited Jan. 8, 2012)
6.
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with
regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine,
Apr. 4, 1997, E.T.S. No. 164, It. No. 145/2001.
7.
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Dec. 18, 2000, 2000
O.J.(C364/01), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdf/text-en.pdf (last visited Nov. 4,
2011).
8.
In re Karen Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 672 (N.J. 1976).
9.
In re Nancy Ellen Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 427 (N.J. 1987).
10.
Airedale N.H.S. Trust v. Bland, [1993) 2 W.L.R. 316 (Eng.).
11.
The Court also cited to Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 793 (1997) and Pretty v. United
Kingdom, App. No. 2346/02, 96 Eur. Ct. H.R. 943-949 (2002).
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the Milan Court of Appeal for a new determination, instructing the lower
court that a judge could authorize removal of life support, when two
circumstances occurred:
a) When the PVS condition is, under rigorous medical
assessment, irreversible and incurable, and no evidence exists,
according to the best international scientific standards, in support
of the possibility for the patient to regain consciousness and
awareness of the outer world.
b) When request of removal is based upon clear, unambiguous,
and convincing evidence that the act would be consistent with the
patient's mind as inferred from her previous declarations,
lifestyle, beliefs, and concept of human dignity.12
With a decree issued on July 9, 2008,13 sixteen years after her car
accident, the Court of Appeal of Milan, on remand, applied the principles
established by the Court of Cassation. The court authorized Mr. Englaro
and Eluana's doctors to discontinue her life-sustaining treatment, finding
that possibilities for Eluana to regain consciousness and awareness of the
outer world were lacking. The evidence presented by Mr. Englaro was
sufficient to determine that Eluana would have requested withdrawal of the
treatment had she been aware of her post-accident physical condition. The
decision provoked immediate reactions by the public.
III. THE ITALIAN PARLIAMENT RAISES A CONFLICT OF COMPETENCE
BEFORE THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

After the decision of the Milan Court of Appeal on remand, the issue
escalated. It reached the highest level of relations between different
branches of government. The House of Deputies (July 31, 2008) and the
Senate (August 1, 2008) of the Italian Parliament passed motions to raise a
conflict of competence between state powers before the Italian
Constitutional Court.14 In the Parliament's view, the judicial branch (i.e.,
the Court of Cassation and Milan Court of Appeal, respectively, in issuing
and applying decision no. 21748/2007) overstepped the boundaries of their
judicial competence, defacto providing innovative statutory-like guidelines
in a field where no legislation had been previously enacted and where

12.
See Stefano Biondi, Can Good Law Make Up For Bad Politics? The Case of Eluana
Englaro, 17 MED. L. REV. 447, 452 (2009), where the author emphasizes the Court of Cassation's
combined use of the "substituted judgment test" and "best interests" approach to limit withdrawal of
treatment to extreme circumstances.
13.
Court Decree, 9 July 2008, n.88, in Corte App. of Milan, 25 June 2008 (It.).
14.
COSTITUZIONE [COST.] [Constitution] art. 134 (Jan. 1, 1948) (It.).
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Parliament is deemed to be vested with discretion in balancing the
constitutional rights involved. Moreover, instead of deciding the case
according to principles inferred and identified within the legal system, as
provided by Article 12, section 2 of the preliminary provisions to the Italian
Civil Code," the guidelines issued by the Court of Cassation would have
been so removed from those principles as to substantially qualify as an
exercise of legislative power, therefore encroaching on a function reserved
by the Constitution exclusively for the Parliament." According to the
Parliament, action taken by the judiciary would have been more
unconstitutional since it addressed a controversial ethical and political
issue, which is the objective of bills previously introduced into the
legislative assembly." It should thus be qualified as an interference with
the legislative process. The Parliament, therefore, asked the Constitutional
Court to annul decision no. 21748/2007 and acts adopted by the Milan
Court of Appeal in an effort to comply with the decision.' 8
IV. THE DECISION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
With order no. 3349 issued on October 10, 2008, the Constitutional

Court declared the conflict of competence raised by the Parliament
inadmissible on three grounds. First, the Court emphasized that the
decisions of the Court of Cassation and the Court of Appeal did not amount
to an exercise of legislative power (i.e., with erga omnes effect) but,
conversely, could only be qualified as judicial acts with interpartes effects,
that is, limited to a single specific case. Second, referring to specific
complaints raised by the Parliament, the Constitutional Court stated that the
Legislative assembly, far from alleging only an encroachment of its
constitutionally protected prerogatives, had criticized the way the Court of
Cassation had selected, interpreted, and applied relevant normative
materials in deciding the case. According to the constant jurisprudence of
the Constitutional Court, these complaints, addressing so called errores in
iudicando (errors in judging the case), do not provide a legitimate ground
for raising a conflict of competence between state powers under Article 134
15.
CODICE CIVILE [C.c.] art. 12, § 2, preliminary provisions (R.D. 16 Mar. 1942, n.262) (It.).
The article ("Interpretation of Statutory Law"), notes that "whenever a case cannot be decided applying
a specific provision, the judge should consider other provisions addressing similar cases or analogous
matters; if a decision cannot still be issued, the case will then have to be decided according to the
general principles of the State legal order" (translation provided by the authors). The article is therefore
clear in imposing a duty on courts to decide every case filed, and forbids a declaration of non liquet.
16.
COSTITUZIONE [COST.] [Constitution] art. 70 (Jan. 1, 1948) (It.).
17.
Id.
18.
Id.
19.
Corte Cost., 8 Oct. 2008, n.334, in Gazz. Uff. No. 43, 15 Oct. 2008 (It.).
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of the Italian Constitution. Indeed, should the Constitutional Court issue
decisions in response to this type of complaints, the traditional role of the
Court would be changed from a specialized body exercising only functions
of judicial review into a judicial body of further instance deciding cases on
the merits.20 Finally, the Constitutional Court emphasized that the
Parliament still retained the power to enact legislation on the subject at any
future time, striking the preferred balance between the various
constitutional interests in consideration. 2 1
V. SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS

Contemporaneous with the raising of the conflict of competence
before the Constitutional Court, on August 1, 2008, the General Office of
the Milan Public Prosecutor (Procura Generale della Repubblica)
challenged, in court, the validity of the decree issued by the Court of
Appeal on remand, and asked for a suspension of its execution. The Joint
Divisions of the Court of Cassation, however, eventually rejected the
challenge declaring it inadmissible on November 13, 2008. The decision of
the Milan Court of Appeal became, therefore, res judicata and fully
enforceable.
On September 3, 2008, the General Director of the Public Health
Service Management for the Lombardy Region, an administrative body,
issued administrative guidelines to all public hospitals of the Region
forbidding withdrawal of artificial hydration from helpless disabled persons
hosted in the Region's public health facilities.22
The Regional
Administrative Tribunal (Tribunal Amministrativo Regionale, TAR) for the
Lombardy Region, was called upon to decide the legitimacy of these
guidelines.23 On January 22, 2009, the TAR annulled them, affirming the
duty of public health facilities to grant admission to their structures and
provide medical care to everyone, including patients lying in PVS to whom

20.

See, e.g., Corte Cost., 19 Dec. 1974, n.289, in Gazz.Uff., 1974 (It.).

21.
See Roberto Romboli, II Conflitto Tra Poteri Dello Stato Sulla Vicenda Englaro: Un
Caso di Evidente Inammissibiliti[The Conflict Between State Powers in the Englaro Case: A Case of
Clear
Inadmissibility],
ASsoCIAzIoNE
DEI
CONSTITUZIONALISTI,
available
at
http://associazionedeicostituzionalisti.it. (last visited Nov. 5, 2011) (It.).
22.
Eluana Englaro was hosted by a public hospital in Lombardy at that time. Mr. Englaro
had asked to the Public Health Service Management of the Region to indicate a public hospital where
withdrawal of the feeding tube could take place.
23.
In Italy and in other civil law countries influenced by the French model of administrative
law, disputes between private parties and the State are handled by "administrative" courts. A first
instance administrative court (TAR) is established in each of the Italian Regions, with jurisdiction over
administrative actions in that Region.
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courts have recognized the right to the withdrawal of life-sustaining
medical treatment.24
The case then reached the supranational level when six Italian disabled
persons and six pro-life associations lodged applications 25 with the
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) claiming that Italy, through the
decision of the Court of Appeal, had infringed Articles 2 ("Right to Life"),
3 ("Prohibition of Torture"), and 6 ("Right to a Fair Trial") of the European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).2 6 On December 23, 2008, the
ECtHR rejected the joint applications on procedural grounds, declaring
unfounded the applicants' claim of harm resulting from the decision, and
also determining that the associations lacked standing as defined by Article
34 of ECHR, 2 7 since they could not prove a direct connection with Eluana
Englaro. The application was also rejected since applicants had not proved
that Italy had violated Articles 2 and 3 of ECHR, failing to adequately
protect the right to life and to enforce the prohibition of torture and
inhumane or degrading treatments.
While in the first days of February Eluana Englaro was moved from a
public hospital to a nursing institution in Udine, Italy, where her feeding
tube could be removed, the Italian Government, under the leadership of
then-President of the Council of Ministers Silvio Berlusconi, resorted to the
Decree-Law mechanism to enact temporary statutory law, making the
28
feeding and hydration of all unconscious, disabled patients mandatory.
On February 6, 2009, however, the Italian President of the Republic,
Trib. Lombardia-Milano-Sec. III., I civ., Jan. 22, 2009, n.214, Foro.It.2009, available at
24.
http://www.ratioiuris.it/File/File/TARMI214.pdf. (last visited Nov. 5, 2011) (It.).
25.
Press Release, European Court of Human Rights, Inadmissibility Decision Ada Rossi and
Others v. Italy (Dec. 22, 2008) (Note on case denying review in Caso Englaro, App. Nos. 55185/08,
55516/08, 55519/08, 56010/08, 56278/r08, 58420/08, 58424/08 on Nov. 18, 2008, and 55483/08 on
Nov. 19, 2008).
European Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S 221, amended by
26.
Protocol 11 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Restructuring the Control Machinery Established thereby, Strasbourg, 11. V. 1994, 155 E.T.S. (1994)
(effective Nov. 1, 1998), available at http://conventions.coe.int. (last visited Nov. 5, 2011).
27.
Press Release, European Court of Human Rights, Inadmissibility Decision Ada Rossi and
others. v. Italy, (Dec. 22, 2008). See also Illaria Andrb, Il Caso Englaro di Frontealla Corte Europea
dei diritti Dell'Uomo: Un Confronto con la Corte di Giustizia delle Comunith Europee circa la
Legittimazione ad Agire delle Associazioni a Difesa dei DirittiDell'Uomo [The Englaro Case before the
European Court ofHuman Rights: A Comparison with the Court ofJustice about the Legal Standing of
Associations in Defense of Human Rights], available at http://www.forumcostituzionale.it/site/images/
stories/pdf/documenti forum/giurisprudenza/corteeuropea diritti-uomo0002_anro.pdf (last visited
Jan. 8, 2012).
28.
According to article 77, § 2 of the Italian Constitution, "the Government, adopts under its
responsibility temporary legislation" (so-called "decree-law"), which is immediately effective.
COSTITUZIONE [COST.] [Constitution] art. 77 (Jan. 1, 1948) (It.).
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Giorgio Napolitano, refused to sign the Decree-Law adopted by the
Government, considering the measure unconstitutional on two grounds:
first, the two constitutional requirements of "necessity and urgency" listed
by Article 77 of the Italian Constitution as a condition for adoption of the
Decree-Law were lacking; second, the Decree-Law would have de facto
overruled the decisions of the Court of Cassation and Milan Court of
Appeal in violation of the principle of separation of powers between the
Judicial and Executive branches. Lacking the signature by the President of
the Republic, the Decree-Law could not become effective. On that same
day, the feeding tube was removed from Eluana's body. In a struggle
between the Executive and Judiciary, closely reminding some of the
passages of the Terry Schiavo case that occurred in 2005 in the United
States,29 Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi convened the Council of
Ministers to draft a bill to be promptly introduced into the Italian
Parliament for approval. The bill aimed to make illegal the act of removing
a feeding tube from all comatose patients. While the vote on the bill was
being scheduled for the following two days, the death of Eluana Englaro
was announced on Monday, February 9, 2009.
VI. SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE PROTECTION OF RIGHTS, SEPARATION OF
POWERS, AND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LAW AND MORALITY

The events surrounding the Englaro case show both "old" and "new"
features in the longstanding, but never faded, clash between protection of
fundamental rights and intrusiveness of political power.30 The decisions of
the Court of Cassation, Milan Court of Appeal, and Constitutional Court,
taken together, also represent a perfect example of a new trend within the
Italian Constitutional system, which furthers movement of the Italian
centralized system of judicial review towards a more decentralized
arrangement, where ordinary courts play a significant constitutional role.
Finally, the decision issued by the Court of Cassation is representative of a
new global trend in which courts worldwide, in deciding cases involving
controversial ethical and moral issues, refer for guidance to foreign case
law addressing analogous matters.

29.
See also Chiara Bologna, Sentenze in forma di legge? Il Caso Englaro e la Lezione
Americana nella Vicenda di Terri Schiavo [Decisions as Law? The Englaro Case and the American
Lesson of the Terry Schiavo
Case] (Feb.
25, 2009),
FORUM COSTITUZIONALE
http://www.forumcostituzionale.it/site/index.php?option=com-fileindex&key=1461&name=0017_bolo

gna.pdf (last visited Jan. 8, 2012) (It.).
30.
See Tania Groppi, Il Caso Englaro: Un Viaggio alle Origini dello Stato di Diritto e
Ritorno [The Englaro Case: A Journey to the Origins of the Rule of Law and Back], 15 POLITICA DEL
DIRITTO 483 (2009) (It.)
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VII. INVASIVENESS OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS

The intrusiveness of the political powers has been clear since the Court
of Cassation recognized the possibility to remove the feeding tube. The
purpose of the political powers was unambiguous-to hinder the legitimate
and constitutionally-protected exercise of the right to self-determination,
coercing the right of a person by means of a heteronymous command, alien
to her own will and her own conception of life. 3 ' The actions taken by the
political power aimed to deny the exercise of the right recognized by the
courts, thwarting the application of the decision of the Court of Cassation.
A. "Old" Features
In our view, some of the elements of this case are directly connected to
the classic conception of rights as negative guarantees against the state's
abuse of powers. They stand as a clear evidence of the need to protect and
reaffirm the basic concept underlying the rule of law principle-that men
should be governed by laws and not by absolute discretion translating into
abuse. The personal right Mr. Englaro required courts to recognize is the
most classic among the so-called "first generation" rights; the right to
personal freedom, codified in Article 13, section 1, of the Italian
Constitution.32 The right to refuse a medical treatment implies a "negative
liberty" and abstention on the part of the public powers from any
interference in the private and personal sphere of the subject. This right is
connected to what has been defined by Article 8.1 of the European
Convention on Human Rights, as interpreted by the ECtHR, as the "right to
private life,"33 that is, the right of an individual to determine what should be
done with her own body. To protect this right, guarantees have been
established over time to limit public powers. Among these guarantees, it is
important to mention for purposes of analysis of the present case, those
represented by the adjudicatory function of the judiciary. Specifically, the
separation of powers principle and the mechanism of "reservation of law,"

31.

Cass., I civ., 16 Oct. 2007, n.21748, Foro It. 12007, vol. I, C.c., 3025,

T 7.5 (It.).

32.
COSTITIUZIONE [COST.] [Constitution] art. 13, § 1 (Jan. 1, 1948) (It.); but see, also,
COSTITUZIONE [COST.] [Constitution] art. 2; 32 § 2 (Jan. 1, 1948) (It.) Which has been interpreted as
"the possibility to refuse medical treatments, to get sick, to lose one's health, living the final stages of
life according to one's own conception of human dignity, and, eventually, die," see Cass., First Civil
Division, October 16, 2007, no. 21748, in Foro it., 2007, vol. 1, cc., 3025 (It.).
33.
Pretty v. United Kingdom, App. No. 2346/02, 96 Eur. Ct. H.R. 943-949, 63 (2002),
available at http://www.cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/viewhbkm.asp?sessionld=78490355&skin=hudocen&ac (last visited Sept. 15, 2011).
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(riserva di legge)3 4 which is expressly included in the text of Article 13 of
the Italian Constitution.
The fundamental rights to refuse medical treatment and to selfdetermination have been consistently recognized and guaranteed by the
judiciary in the various decisions issued during the unfolding of events
characterizing Ms. Englaro's story. A key role in the judicial guarantee of
these rights has been played both by the Court of Cassation with decision
no. 21748/2007 (recognizing for the first time the right to withdrawal of
life-sustaining medical treatments for a patient on the basis of her previous
statements) and by the TAR of Lombardy with decision no. 214/2008
(which, in declaring the illegitimacy of refusals of hospitalization for
patients whose right to discontinue medical treatment had been recognized
by courts, affirmed the duty for the State and all public hospitals to provide
conditions for the concrete exercise of that right).
On a different level, to state that rights and freedoms translate into a
claim of non-intrusiveness of the political power into personal freedom
does not necessarily mean that public bodies should be excluded from
playing any role in the protection of rights, even in case of negative
liberties. This role should find a first and privileged ground of application
in the use of the so-called "reservation of law" guarantee, which is the tool
that the political power can use to balance and possibly limit some
constitutional rights, respecting at the same time the rigidity of the
Constitution.36 In our view, the reservation of law mechanism safeguards
an individual's rights in two ways: on one hand, exclusively reserving
definition of the subject matter to an act of the legislative body, it implicitly
mandates a public and transparent parliamentary debate and involvement of
parliamentary minorities in the enactment of the law; on the other hand,
since it furthers adoption of an act (statutory law) that applies generally, it
guarantees the principle of equality and avoids abuse. The inactivity of the
legislature in the area of living wills compromised both guarantees. In the
absence of statutory law, the Executive took, through the adoption of a
Decree-Law, action directed at affecting a single subjective situation (ad
personam acts). The system of constitutional guarantees established by the
Italian Constituents to safeguard respect for the principle of separation of
powers has, nonetheless, proved to be effective. This is particularly
evident, at the outset, in the ordinance issued by the Constitutional Court,
rejecting the Parliament's contention of encroachment of powers reserved
34.
Matters subjected by the Constitution to the "riserva di legge" (reservation of law) are
deemed reserved to definition by a legislative body, to the exclusion of all the others. See, e.g.,
COSTITUZIONE [COST.] [Constitution] art. 13, § 2 (Jan. 1, 1948) (It.).
35.

4
Cass., I civ., 16 Oct. 2007, n.217 8, Foro It. 12007, vol. 1,C.c., 3025,17.5 (It.).

36.

COSTITUZIONE [COST.] [Constitution] art. 13,

§2

(Jan. 1, 1948) (It.).

2011]

Gentili & Groppi

83

to the legislative body by the judiciary. The issue presented before the
Constitutional Court is connected to a foundational element of the rule of
law principle-the distinction between the power assigned to the
Parliament of adopting general, open-ended legislative acts and the exercise
of jurisdictional activity, which, by way of difference, applies only to the
single case before a court. Situations like this in which, as underlined by
the Constitutional Court, "the Parliament is free to adopt, at any given
moment, specific legislation addressing the subject, striking the appropriate
balance between the fundamental constitutional interests involved."37
Moreover, in our view, the refusal of the President of the Republic to sign
the Decree-Law is consistent with the role assigned by the Italian
Constitution to the Head of State as guarantor of the Constitution and of the
correct unfolding of the relations between different State powers. In the
case at issue, the President exercised this role in a twofold way: first,
safeguarding the judicial power from an act of the executive aiming de
facto at overruling the decisions of the courts in violation of a well-rooted
principle of the rule of law tradition as recognized by the Constitutional
Court in several cases.
Second, in determining the absence of the
conditions of "necessity and urgency" required by Article 77, section 2, of
the Constitution, for adoption of a Decree-Law, and, therefore,
guaranteeing the correct exercise of the legislative function as vested in the
legislative body against encroachment by the executive power.39
B. "New" Features
Some features of this case present new elements which are connected
to the establishment of the so-called "Constitutional State."40 The clash
between a specific political, parliamentary majority and the judiciary was
enhanced by protection given by the Court of Cassation to a right in the
absence of any previously enacted statutory law on the subject. This issue
found its most dramatic point in the conflict of competences raised by the
Italian Parliament before the Constitutional Court. In our view, this is the
consequence of the increased difficulty for legislative bodies in the
Constitutional State to strike a balance between different and competing
37.
Corte Cost., 8 Oct. 2008, order no. 334, in Gazz. Uff. no. 43, October 15th, 2008,
available at http://www.cortecostituzionale.it (last visited Jan. 8, 2012) (It.).
38.
See e.g. Corte Cost.,
12 July 200, decision no. 374, available at
http://www.cortecostituzionale.it (last visited Jan. 8, 2012) (It.). An act directly affecting the holding of
a single judicial decision determines a "harm to the principles shaping the relations between legislative
and judicial power." Decision available at http://www.cortecostituzionale.it (last visited Jan. 8, 2012)
(It.).
39.
COSTITUZIONE [COST.] [Constitution] art. 77, §2, (Jan. 1, 1948) (It.).
40.
NICK BARBER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATE (Oxford University Press, 2010).

84

ILSA JournalofInternational& ComparativeLaw

[Vol. I18: 1

constitutional interests and to adopt general rules applicable erga omnes in
sensitive areas of law. Indeed, in the Constitutional State understood as a
Pluralist State, legislation enacted by legislative bodies has lost its ability to
play the unifying role it had furthered in the Legislative State. 4 1 The
reaction of the Italian Parliament is understandable only in terms of a
political power still acting according to the tenets and principles of the
Legislative State, where a central role is played by statutory law. The
Italian Parliament refused to accept the idea that "its own legislation, [could
be] treated only as 'a part' of the general law applicable in the legal system,
and not as the whole of it," i.e., its pure embodiment.4 2 This reaction
represents the attempt to hinder the establishment of a different conception
of State-that of the Constitutional State-in which the concept of "law,"
in general, does not necessarily coincide with legislation, but, conversely, is
the product of the "moderate" coexistence of statutory law, rights, and
judge-made law.
VIII. TOWARD A "MORE DECENTRALIZED SYSTEM" OF JUDICIAL REVIEW?
THE JUDICIAL POWER AS GUARANTOR OF THE STRUCTURAL COMPLEXITY
OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATE

In our view, the Englaro case is also emblematic in showing the
general process of re-definition of the traditional hierarchy of legal sources
currently experienced by Italy, a civil law country 4 3 _a process
characterized by the increased relevance played by judicial intervention in
the production of law, to the detriment of the central role traditionally
enjoyed by legislation. In issuing decision no. 21748/2007", the Court of
Cassation correctly interpreted the task requested to a judge in the
Constitutional State and proved to be receptive of the approach mandated
by the Italian Constitutional Court. Indeed, since the 1990s, the Italian
Constitutional Court has initiated a process of redefinition of the very roots
of the Italian system of constitutional justice. Traditionally classified as
centralized, 45 the Italian system of constitutional justice vests a single
specialized judicial body with functions of judicial review while lower
courts and judges have always been described as "doorkeepers"6 in a
"bottom-up" process activated through the "incidenter" review. Ordinary
41.
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42.
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and administrative judges decide whether to raise a question of
constitutional legitimacy before the Constitutional Court when some
prerequisites ("non manifesta infondatezza" e "rilevanza") are found to be
present.47 However, the Constitutional Court, in the past years, through its
innovative case law has reversed this process, making it a "top-down" one.
The Court has recognized an important role for all judges, not only in
applying its decisions, but also and more importantly, in directly carrying
on a control on the constitutionality of statutory law with the only limit
represented by the impossibility for ordinary judges to directly not apply
(i.e., without first resorting to the Constitutional Court) the law deemed
unconstitutional.4 8 Increasingly often, the Constitutional Court declares the
inadmissibility of the question of constitutional legitimacy asking the ad
hoc judge to provide a "constitutionally adequate" interpretation of the
statutory law at issue.49 Before referring a question to the Constitutional
Court, an ordinary judge is now expected to look for an interpretation of the
statute that would preserve its constitutional validityo and show, together
with the two aforementioned requirements, that a constitutionally adequate
interpretation was not possible.5 ' These developments assign greater
importance to the role ordinary judges play in the process of constitutional
adjudication, taking it closer to the one played by ordinary judges in

47.
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decentralized systems of judicial review.5 2 The Court now tries, therefore,
to decentralize its work maximally, calling upon ordinary judges to
participate in the constitutional review more than the traditional European
centralized model of judicial review would normally require, sharing with
them the task of safeguarding the Constitution. This new development is
also based on the difficult distinction between the power to interpret (for
ordinary judges) and the power to set aside (for the Constitutional Court) a
legislative provision, which is characteristic of the European model of
judicial review.s3 Although ordinary judges cannot disregard statutes on
constitutional grounds, they can interpret them, even if sometimes it is
difficult to identify the limits of an "interpretation."
One fact is clear,
though. In Italy, this distinction is changing in favor of the judiciary by
request of the Constitutional Court, prompting a transfer of power from the
Constitutional Court to ordinary judges. While this practice brings with it
the risk that ordinary judges will avoid referring questions of constitutional
legitimacy to the Constitutional Court in cases when it would be necessary
and appropriate, it also has the advantage of bringing about a more concrete
(i.e., closer to the facts of the case) analysis of the constitutionality of the
legislation in a decision which only has interpartes effect (unlike decisions
issued by the Constitutional Court declaring the unconstitutionality of a
Statute, which enjoy erga omnes effect).
The Italian Constitutional Court, however, has gone even further. In a
famous decision dealing with a case of artificial insemination, the Court
called upon ordinary judges not only to apply a legal principle previously
established by the Constitutional Court, but also to decide a case making
direct application of the provisions of the Constitution." That case was
dealing, just like the Englaro case, with an issue-artificial inseminationwhich at that time was still not regulated by legislation. 6 Requested by the
ad hoc judge to declare unconstitutional the lack of legislative discipline
and to elaborate on the legal principles to be applied to the case through an
interpretation of the Constitution, the Constitutional Court refused to do
so.5 Conversely, in declaring the request inadmissible, the Court invited
52.
Id.
53.
See Groppi, supranote 63, at 113; Ferreres Comella, supranote 63, at 461,474.
54.
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the ad hoc judge to identify, on her own, the principles to be applied to the
case, elaborating them directly from the constitutional system considered in
its entirety, without calling into cause the Constitutional Court.s8 In
reaching its decision in the Englaro case, the Court of Cassation
demonstrated a full awareness of the evolution of the Constitutional Court's
jurisprudence. Indeed, the Court of Cassation, in issuing decision no.
21748/2007, made explicit reference to decision no. 347/1998 of the
Constitutional Court, without raising the issue of constitutionality, and
directly identifying the principles and legal rules to be applied to the instant
case within the Italian Constitutional framework.5 9
XI. TRANS-JUDICIAL COMMUNICATION

Finally, the decision of the Court of Cassation is representative of a
general trend embraced with increased frequency by courts worldwide.
When confronted with cases dealing with controversial ethical and moral
issues (and increasingly so in areas still unaddressed by the legislature),
several courts worldwide have shown a tendency to refer to decisions of
foreign judicial bodies on analogous matters for guidance.
This
phenomenon has attracted increasing attention by legal scholars worldwide,
who have variously defined it as instances of trans-judicial communication,
cross-judicial fertilization, furthering a migration of constitutional ideas,
and addressing mainly problems of legitimacy involved in the practice.60
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X. CONCLUSION

The current system of judicial review of legislation in Italy differs
from the one originally designed by the constituents, even if its structure
remains formally unaltered. The shift from a centralized system of judicial
review towards a more decentralized system brings with it an important
consequence. That is, there is a shift from a judicial review of legislation,
based almost exclusively on Constitutional Court decisions with erga
omnes effects, to one that increasingly relies on decisions by ordinary
judges with interpartes effects. In a globalized world where statutory law
increasingly proves to be an inadequate tool to discipline areas of law
involving sensitive ethical and moral issues, ordinary judges are assigned a
new task-that of becoming guarantors of the structural complexity of the
Constitutional State.

